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Inevitable, Flexible, Expandable Caperton? 
Bert Brandenburg† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The fact pattern leading to Caperton v. Massey1 sounds extreme.  A 
West Virginia jury found Massey Coal Company liable for fraudulent 
misrepresentation and tortious interference with existing contractual rela-
tions.2  The jury awarded damages of $50 million.3  Massey appealed to 
the West Virginia Supreme Court during a heated high court election that 
pitted incumbent Warren McGraw against challenger Brent Benjamin.4  
The CEO of Massey Coal Company, Don Blankenship, spent $3 million 
of his personal funds in support of candidate Benjamin—three times the 
total spent by Benjamin’s own campaign.5  Benjamin won and assumed 
his position as state supreme court justice.6  When the case came before 
the state high court almost two years later, Justice Benjamin refused to 
recuse himself.7  Instead, he joined a 3–2 decision in favor of Blanken-
ship’s Massey Coal Company and reversed the damages awarded by the 
jury.8 
                                                 
† Executive Director, Justice at Stake Campaign.  Justice at Stake, a nonpartisan national partnership, 
works to keep courts fair, impartial, and independent.  The views expressed here do not necessarily 
reflect the opinions of Justice at Stake partner organizations or board members.  Justice at Stake filed 
an amicus brief in Caperton in support of the petitioners.  The organization does not support any one 
system of selecting state judges.  This article is drawn from comments delivered at “State Judicial 
Independence: A National Concern,” a conference hosted by the Seattle University School of Law 
on September 14, 2009. 
 1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 2254. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 16, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-16-grisham-
court_N.htm; Robert Barnes, Case May Define When a Judge Must Recuse Self, WASHINGTON 
POST, Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009 
/03/01/AR2009030102265_3.html?sid=ST2009030201125. 
 5. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 2258. 
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Many people found this sequence appalling, but for anyone follow-
ing judicial elections over the past decade, it cannot be seen as surpris-
ing.9  Caperton represents the logical—even predictable—culmination of 
a decade-long trend toward high-cost, aggressive campaigns for the 
elected judiciary.10  State high court contests are undergoing a major 
transformation that could radically impact our justice system: if left un-
checked, the new politics of judicial elections will affect the impartiality 
of our courts and jeopardize the public’s confidence in a fair court sys-
tem. 
When Caperton v. Massey came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
June 2009, the Court took these concerns to heart and ruled that the due 
process right to a fair trial required Justice Benjamin to recuse himself.11  
Many commentators view Caperton as a limited decision because it set 
stringent criteria for future due process recusal claims, but the revolutio-
nary ferment surrounding judicial elections could make Caperton-style 
fact patterns more common in the years to come.12  The fundamental 
fears that the Court expressed—that impartial justice and public confi-
dence in the courts could be imperiled—will be stoked and aggravated 
by the financial arms race that now accompanies judicial elections.  The 
new politics of judicial elections made a Caperton fact pattern inevitable.  
As court campaigns grow more corrosive, lower courts will have more 
opportunities to apply and expand Caperton’s principles to enforce re-
cusal more seriously.  As a result, Caperton could mark the tangible be-
ginning of a new consciousness about the role of money in judicial elec-
tions. 
II.  INEVITABLE CAPERTON: THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
Over the past decade, a growing tide of political and special-interest 
pressure has threatened the cherished independence of our courts.13  Al-
                                                 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra note 21. 
 11. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267–68. 
 12. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court Breakfast Table, SLATE, June 24, 2009, 
available at http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221229/. 
 13. See, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: HOW 
2000 WAS A WATERSHED YEAR FOR BIG MONEY, SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE, AND TV 
ADVERTISING IN STATE SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGNS (Justice at Stake 2002); DEBORAH GOLDBERG 
& SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2002: HOW THE THREAT TO 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS SPREAD (Bert Brandenburg ed., Justice at Stake 2004); DEBORAH 
GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004: HOW SPECIAL INTEREST 
PRESSURE ON OUR COURTS HAS REACHED A “TIPPING POINT”—AND HOW TO KEEP OUR COURTS 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL (Jesse Rutledge ed., Justice at Stake 2005); JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006: HOW 2006 WAS THE MOST THREATENING YEAR YET TO 
THE FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY OF OUR COURTS—AND HOW AMERICANS ARE FIGHTING BACK 
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though most states conduct supreme court elections,14 judges traditional-
ly have not had to raise huge war chests, cater to special interests, make 
sound-bite promises, or respond to hardball campaign attacks.  In recent 
years, however, the growing role of monetary contributions and aggres-
sive campaigning has transformed state supreme court contests.  These 
trends—tens of millions of dollars raised by candidates from parties who 
may appear before them, millions more poured in by interest groups, nas-
ty and misleading ads, and pressure on judges to signal courtroom rulings 
on the campaign trail—have become the new normal.15  Campaign-trail 
politics is pressuring judges to become accountable to partisans and spe-
cial interests instead of to the law and the Constitution.16  Many Ameri-
cans have come to fear that justice is for sale.17  Given these trends, the 
real surprise seems to be why a Caperton-style fact pattern did not arrive 
sooner. 
In just a decade, big money has assumed a major role in high court 
contests across America.  Because state courts handle more than 98% of 
all lawsuits in America, the judicial independence of these high courts is 
especially important, and yet, would-be justices must raise millions of 
dollars from individuals and groups with business before the courts.18  
Millions more are spent by political parties and special interest groups, 
though much of this support goes undisclosed.19  This “new politics of 
judicial elections” burst on the scene with the 1999–2000 election cycle, 
when total spending by state supreme court candidates increased 62% 
from the previous election cycle.20 
Since 2000, expensive campaigns have become all but essential for 
candidates to reach the high court in states without public financing sys-
tems for judicial elections.21  From 1999–2008, supreme court candidates 
                                                                                                             
(Jesse Rutledge ed., Justice at Stake 2007); JUSTICE AT STAKE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS IN THE GREAT LAKES STATES, 2000–2008 (Jesse Rutledge ed., Justice at Stake 2008); 
JUSTICE AT STAKE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009 (forthcoming 2010). 
 14. Eighty-seven percent of all state judges face some elections, and thirty-eight states hold 
supreme court elections.  See National Center for State Courts, FAQ: Judicial Selection and Reten-
tion—How Many State Judges are Elected?, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Cour Top-
ics/FAQs.asp?topic=JudSel#FAQ628. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See JUSTICE AT STAKE, JUSTICE AT STAKE—STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 
(2001), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResults_EA883 
8C0504A5.pdf. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See supra note 14. 
 20. Id. 
 21. During the earlier decade, twenty-six candidates raised $1 million or more, and all but two 
came from three states: Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  In 1999–2008, by contrast, there were 
sixty-five “million-dollar” candidates, from a dozen states.  JUSTICE AT STAKE, THE NEW POLITICS 
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raised $200.7 million nationally, more than double the $85.4 million 
raised from 1989–1998.22  An arms race between trial attorneys and 
business interests had boiled over, and national organizations began sys-
tematically targeting high court races.23 
Fueled by the explosion of money in high court elections, the past 
decade has also seen an unprecedented surge in money spent on TV ads 
in judicial races.24  These ads have little to do with the qualifications 
needed to make a good judge.  Instead, they create a dark fantasy 
world—complete with frightening horror-movie music—populated by 
abused children, fearsome rapists, malevolent corporations, greedy law-
yers, and judges who apparently spend all their time trying to hurt ordi-
nary Americans.25  In the 2004 campaign that unseated Justice McGraw 
and led to Caperton, Massey CEO Blankenship gave $2.4 million to a 
specially created group, “And for the Sake of the Kids,” which ran a bat-
tery of ads against McGraw.26  In one of them, the announcer said: 
Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw voted to release child rapist 
Tony Arbaugh from prison.  Worse, McGraw agreed to let this con-
victed child rapist work as a janitor, in a West Virginia school.  Let-
ting a child rapist go free?  To work in our schools?  That’s radical 
Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw.  Warren McGraw—too 
soft on crime.  Too dangerous for our kids.27 
As twenty-first century politics take over judicial elections, it is 
simply unsurprising that a fact pattern like Caperton would emerge.  
Elections put too much money and power at stake.  Like contestants in 
                                                                                                             
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (forthcoming May, 2010).  During the same 1999–2008 period, nineteen of 
the twenty-two states that competitively elect Supreme Court judges set spending records.  Id.  In the 
five most expensive states, 51.7% of the total spent on the best-funded candidates came from just 
twenty-five “Super Spender” groups.  Id.  These elite twenty-five super spenders invested an average 
of $362,000 apiece.  Id.  By contrast, the nearly 9,000 remaining contributors accounted for less than 
half of the total.  Id.  Their average contribution was about $943.  Id. 
 22. Press Release, Justice at Stake, Citizens United Called Grave Threat for America’s Courts 
(Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.cfm/cit 
izens_united_called_grave_threat_for_americas_courts?show=news&newsID=6669. 
 23. JUSTICE AT STAKE, supra note 21. 
 24. From 1999 to 2008, high court candidates spent an estimated $89.3 million on airtime for 
television advertisements, including an estimated $6.6 million spent in the unusually costly odd-year 
elections in 2007.  Id.  Just 22% of states with contested supreme court elections featured television 
advertising in 2000, but that number jumped to 64% in 2002.  Id.  By 2004, judicial TV ads were the 
unquestioned norm; 80% of states with contested elections ran TV ads.  Id.  And that number rose 
even further to 91% in 2006.  Id.  Of the fifteen states with contested elections in 2008, TV ads ap-
peared in thirteen (over 85%) of them.   Id.  Minnesota and Washington were the only two states 
where televisions ads did not run in high court contests.  Id. 
 25. See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 13, at 4–5, 13, 22, 35, 37. 
 26. See, e.g., GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, supra note 
13. 
 27. Id. at 5–6. 
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any arms race, judges compete to raise millions of dollars, often from 
parties who appear before them.  This fundraising worries the public: 
opinion surveys show that three out of four Americans think that cam-
paign contributions to judges affect the outcome of cases in the cour-
troom.28  Even more chilling is a poll showing that 46% of state judges 
agree.29  As Illinois Supreme Court Justice Lloyd Karmeier said in his 
victory speech on election night in 2004, after the two candidates had 
raised a record $9.3 million, “That’s obscene for a judicial race. . . . What 
does it gain people?  How can people have faith in the system?”30 
III.  FLEXIBLE CAPERTON? 
On its face, Caperton appears limited.  “Our decision today ad-
dresses an extraordinary situation where the Constitution requires recus-
al,” wrote Justice Kennedy.31  “Not every campaign contribution by a 
litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge’s 
recusal, but this is an exceptional case.”32  Afterward, former Texas 
Chief Justice Tom Phillips mused that “[g]iven how narrow that holding 
is, I’m not sure Caperton will ever be direct precedent for another recus-
al.”33 
But if judicial election campaigns continue to generate more mas-
sive outside spending, the Court’s own reasoning in Caperton could 
mean that such “exceptional” fact patterns become more frequent.  The 
criteria are specific, but with each new election cycle, it is more likely 
that “a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant 
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising 
funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was 
pending or imminent.”34 
Moreover, because “[t]he inquiry centers on the contribution’s rela-
tive size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the 
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect 
                                                 
 28. Press Release, Justice at Stake, Poll: Frequency Questionnaire (Oct. 30–Nov. 7, 2001), 
available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults_6F537F99272D 
4.pdf. 
 29. Press Release, Justice at Stake, Poll: State Judges Frequency Questionnaire (Nov. 5, 2001–
Jan. 2, 2002), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResults_EA 
8838C0504A5.pdf. 
 30. Ryan Keith, Republican Lloyd Karmeier Wins Supreme Court Seat, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Nov. 3, 2004. 
 31. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009). 
 32. Id. at 2263. 
 33. Posting of Tony Mauro to The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times, Coping With Caperton: A 
Q&A with Tom Phillips, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/coping-with-caperton-a-
conversation-with-tom-phillips.html (June 10, 2009, 16:21 EST). 
 34. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. 
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such contribution had on the outcome of the election,” the Caperton test 
is aimed at campaigns where a single player plays an outsized role.35  
Because judicial elections do not attract the sheer number of players who 
routinely contribute significant resources to legislative and executive 
contests, elections where individual parties seek to dominate the cam-
paign are more likely. 
Because judicial elections themselves are changing, growing more 
costly, and becoming prone to outside spending, the Caperton standard 
could prove to be more flexible than many assume.  Especially in the 
wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,36 which bars 
states from keeping a lid on outside corporate and union spending cam-
paigns, more extreme Caperton-like fact patterns could be just around 
the corner. 
IV.  EXPANDABLE CAPERTON 
“As new problems have emerged that were not discussed at com-
mon law, however, the Court has identified additional instances 
which, as an objective matter, require recusal.” 
Justice Kennedy, Caperton v. Massey37 
Behind the black letter of Caperton lie broader principles that invite 
deeper thinking and a new consciousness about when judges should re-
cuse themselves.  The Court’s stated rationales for its Caperton decision 
are anything but narrow.  For example, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[n]o 
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause because his interest would 
certainly bias his judgment, and not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”38  
The Court also realistically defined the effect of such contributions: 
“Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice Benjamin would nev-
ertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary ef-
forts to get him elected.”39  Finally, Justice Kennedy wrote that due 
process requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor’s in-
fluence on the election, under all the circumstances, “would offer a poss-
ible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the 
balance nice, clear, and true.”40 
These are global concerns that are rooted in timeless views of hu-
man nature, its susceptibility to outside influence, and the universal de-
                                                 
 35. Id. at 2264. 
 36. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 08-205, 2010 WL 183856 (U.S. Jan. 21, 
2010). 
 37. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 2262. 
 40. Id. at 2264 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). 
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mand that justice be impartial. This is why the public feels very strongly 
that judges should step aside when hearing cases from major backers.41  
These principles, reinforced by three developments—evidence that Ca-
perton is being used sparingly, the changing nature of judicial elections, 
and the potential expansion of corporate spending—could lead future 
courts to use Caperton more seriously as a foundation to enforce recusal 
as a requirement of due process. 
First, more than six months after Caperton was decided, there is lit-
tle sign of the flood of litigation that was direly predicted.  Caperton has 
been applied sparingly and invoked infrequently.42  Attorneys can hardly 
be expected to be rash in asking judges, in front of whom they must ap-
pear, to recuse themselves. 
Second, as I have outlined above, judicial elections are changing, 
not just dramatically, but perhaps in a revolutionary way.  As more mil-
lions of dollars flood into our courts of law, through whatever route, the 
very nature of impartial justice will come into question.  As retired Su-
preme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recently put it, “[I]f both 
sides unleash their campaign spending monies without restrictions, then I 
think mutually-assured destruction is the most likely outcome.”43  The 
potential for a “debt of gratitude” or a “possible temptation” will only 
continue to rise. 
Finally, a new spigot of money may be about to be turned on.  In 
January 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the 
Court ruled that restrictions on outside corporate and union spending on 
elections are unconstitutional.44  Such a ruling could blow the judicial 
election arms race wide open.  In his dissent, Justice Stevens warned, “At 
a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have 
reached a fever pitch . . . the Court today unleashes the floodgates of 
corporate and union general treasury spending in these races.”45  Where 
more money comes, regardless of its source, more recusals should follow 
if courts are going to stay fair and enjoy public confidence. 
                                                 
 41. Press Release, Justice at Stake, Poll: Huge Majority Wants Firewall Between Judges, Elec-
tion Backers (Feb. 22, 2009), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releas 
es.cfm/poll_huge_majority_wants_firewall_between_judges_election_backers?show=news&newsID
=5677. 
 42. As of March 31, 2010, there are forty-nine citations in the Westlaw databank of “All States 
and Federal Cases” for the Caperton citation, 129 S. Ct. 2252, in West’s Supreme Court Reporter.  
Many of the citations did not even involve recusal motions or campaign-trail conduct, and courts 
have been routinely rejecting the few recusal requests actually made. 
 43. Adam Liptak, Former Justice O’Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance Ruling, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at A16. 
 44. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 08-205, 2010 WL 183856 (U.S. Jan. 21, 
2010). 
 45. Id. at *86. 
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Each of these developments, and others unforeseen, could lead the 
Supreme Court back to the issue that it grappled with in Caperton: if jus-
tice is going to be impartial in both fact and appearance, at what point 
does campaign support suggest that the wisest course of action would be 
to let another judge hear a case?  The public is not conflicted over this 
point; a recent survey showed that more than 80% of all voters support 
the idea of having a different judge decide recusal requests and agree that 
judges should not hear cases involving major campaign backers.46  
Americans are unlikely to accept a court system that is overrun by mon-
ey, politics and partisanship, but until Caperton is more seriously ap-
plied, they will have no other choice. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Caperton fact pattern was a culmination of developments that 
have been brewing for years.  As judicial elections continue to worsen, 
basic considerations of constitutional due process demand that recusal be 
taken more seriously.  Courts are supposed to be insulated from big 
money and special-interest pressure so that judges can do their jobs 
without looking over their shoulders.  Effective recusal standards will 
become increasingly important in ensuring that our courts are accounta-
ble to the law and the Constitution, not to partisan and special-interest 
pressure. 
                                                 
 46. Press Release, Justice at Stake, Poll: Huge Majority Wants Firewall, supra note 41. 
